The tragic events of 911 and the concerns about the potential for a terrorist or hostile state attack with weapons of mass destruction have led to an increased emphasis on risk analysis for homeland security. Uncertain hazards (natural and engineering) have been analyzed using Probabilistic Risk Analysis. Unlike uncertain hazards, terrorists and hostile states are intelligent adversaries who adapt their plans and actions to achieve their strategic objectives. This paper compares uncertain hazard risk analysis with intelligent adversary risk analysis, describes the intelligent adversary risk analysis challenges, and uses a defender-attacker-defender decision analysis model to evaluate defender investments. The model includes defender decisions prior to an attack; attacker decisions during the attack; defender actions after an attack; and the uncertainties of attack implementation, detection, and consequences. The risk management model is demonstrated with an illustrative bioterrorism problem with notional data. 
threats. The critical risk analysis question addressed in this paper is: are the standard PRA techniques for uncertain hazard techniques adequate and appropriate for intelligent adversaries? Our answer is an emphatic no. We will show that treating adversary decisions as uncertain hazards is inappropriate because it provides the wrong assessment of risks.
In the rest of this section, we describe the difference between natural hazards and intelligent adversaries and demonstrate, with a simple example, that standard PRA does not properly assess the risk of an intelligent adversary attack. In the second section, we describe a canonical model for resource allocation decision making for an intelligent adversary problem using an illustrative bioterrorism example with notional data. In the third section, we describe the illustrative analysis results obtained for model and discuss the insights they provide for risk management. In the fourth section, we describe the benefits and limitations of the model. Finally, we discuss future work and our conclusions.
Intelligent adversary risk analysis requires new approaches
We believe that risk analysis of uncertain hazards is fundamentally different than risk analysis of intelligent adversaries. Others have found that there are differences between risks from intelligent adversaries and other risk management decisions (Willis, 2006) . Some of the key differences are summarized in the Table 1 below (NRC, 2008) . A key difference is historical data. For many uncertain events, both natural and engineered, we have not only historical data of extreme failures or crises, but many times we can replicate events in a laboratory environment for further study (engineered systems) or analyze using complex simulations. Intelligent adversary attacks have a long historical background, but the aims, events, and effects have incomplete documentation.
Both risk of occurrence and geographical risk can be narrowed down and identified concretely.
Intelligent adversary targets vary by the goals of the adversary and can be vastly dissimilar between adversary attacks. ational and homeland security measures).
Intelligent adversary events:
Governments may be able to influence terrorism (e.g., foreign policy; international cooperation; n Government and in well-known mitigation measures.
insureds can invest encies may Weapons types are numerous. Federal ag be in a better position to develop more efficient global mitigation programs.
Preparedness and Prevention
Modified form Kunreuthe , " Perspectives", in OECD n OECD lumns The ability to influence the event is also different. Though we can prepare, we typically have no way of influencing the natural event to occur or not occur. On the other hand, governments may be able to affect terrorism attacks by a variety of offensive and defensive measures. Additionally, adversary attacks can take on so many forms that one cannot realistically defend against all types of attacks.
We believe that PRA still has an important role in intelligent adversary risk analysis for assessment of vulnerabilities and consequences, but we do not believe we should assess probabilities of adversary decisions. With uncertain hazards, the systems (e.g. hurricanes, nuclear reactors, or space systems) do not make decisions so the uncertainties can be assigned a probability distribution based on historical data, tests, models, simulations, or expert assessment. However, when we consider intelligent adversary risk analysis, the adversary will make future decisions based on their objectives, our actions, and future information about their ability to achieve their objectives that is revealed during a scenario. Instead, we believe the probabilities of adversary decisions should be an output of not an input to risk analysis models (NRC 2008).
An Illustrative Bioterrorism Example
In order to make our argument and our proposed alternative more explicit, we use a bioterrorism illustrative example. 
Event Trees Do Not Properly Model Intelligent Adversary Risk
Event trees have been useful for modeling uncertain hazards (Pate-Cornell, 2002) . However, there is a difference in the modeling of intelligent adversary decisions that event trees do not capture.
The attacker makes decisions to achieve his objectives. The defender makes resource allocation decisions before and after an attack to try to mitigate vulnerabilities and consequences of the attacker's actions. This dynamic sequence of decisions made by first defender, then an attacker, then again by the defender should not be modeled by assessing probabilities of the attacker's decisions.
For example, when the attacker looks at the defender's preparations for their possible bioterror attack, they do not assign probabilities to their decisions; they choose the agent and the target based on their perceived ability to acquire the agent and successfully attack the target that will give them the effects they desire to achieve their objectives. In the 911 attack, the terrorists decided to attack the World Trade Center and targets in Washington DC using airplanes loaded with fuel to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, they choose flights and timing to maximize their probability of success.
They did not assign probabilities to these decisions.
Representing an attacker decision as a probability can result in a fundamentally different and flawed risk assessment. Consider the simple bioterrorism event tree given in Figure 1 with notional data. For each agent (A and B) there is a probability that an adversary will attack, a probability of attack success, and an expected consequence for each outcome (at the terminal node of the tree). The probability of success involves many factors including the probability of obtaining the agent and the probability of detection during attack preparations and execution. The consequences depend on many factors including agent propagation, agent lethality, time to detection, and risk mitigation. Calculating expected values in Figure 1 , we would assess expected consequences of 32. We would be primarily concerned about agent B because it contributes 84% of the expected consequences (30*0.9=27 for B of the total of 32).
Figure 1: Event Tree Example
However, adversaries do not assign probabilities to their decisions; they make decisions to achieve their objectives, which may be to maximize the consequences they can inflict (Golany et al., If we use a decision tree as in Figure 2 , we replace the initial probability node with a decision node since this is an adversary decision. We find that the intelligent adversary would select agent A, and the expected consequences are 50, which is a different result than with the event tree. The expected consequences are greater and the primary agent of concern is now A. Clearly, event trees underestimate the risk and provide the wrong risk ranking. However, while providing an important insight into the fundamental flaw of using event trees for intelligent adversary risk analysis, this simple decision tree model does not sufficiently model the fundamental structure of intelligent adversary risk.
CANONICAL INTELLIGENT ADVERSARY RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL FOR BIOTERRISM
We believe the canonical risk management model for bioterrorism homeland security must have at six components: the initial actions of the defender to acquire defensive capabilities, the attacker's uncertain acquisition of the agents (e.g., A, B, and C), the attacker's target selection and method of attack(s) given agent acquisition, the defender's risk mitigation actions given attack detection, the uncertain consequences, and the cost of the defender actions. In general the defender decisions can provide offensive, defensive, or informational capabilities. We are not considering offensive decisions such as preemption before an attack; however, we are considering decisions that will increase our (BioWatch, 2003) . In our defender-attackerdefender decision analysis model, we have the two defender decisions (buy vaccine, add a Bio Watch city), the agent acquisition is uncertain, the target and method of attack are attacker decisions, the consequences (fatalities and economic) are uncertain, and the costs are known. The U.S. risk is defined as the probability of adverse consequences and is modeled using a multiobjective additive model similar to multiobjective value models (Kirkwood, 1997) . The defender minimizes the risk and the attacker maximizes the risk. We implemented a decision tree ( Figure 3 ) and an influence diagram (Figure 4 ) using DPL. The mathematical formulation of our model and the notional data are provided in the appendix. The illustrative decision tree model ( Figure 3 ) begins with decisions that the defender (U.S.) makes to deter the adversary by reducing the vulnerabilities or be better prepared to mitigate a bioterrorism attack of agents A, B, or C. We modeled the agents to represent notional bioterror agents using the CDCs agent categories in Table 2 below. For example, agent A represents a notional agent from category A. Bio Watch is a program that installs and monitors a series of passive sensors within a major metropolitan city (BioWatch, 2003) . The BioShield program is a plan to purchase and store vaccines for some of the more dangerous pathogens (BioShield, 2004) . The defender first decides whether or not to add another city to the Bio Watch program. If that city is attacked, this decision could affect the warning time, which influences the response and ultimately the potential consequences of an attack. Of course the BioWatch system does not detect every agent, so we modeled agent C to be the most effective agent that the BioWatch system does not sense and therefore will give no additional warning. Adding a city will also incur a cost in dollars for the U.S.
Category Definition

A
The U.S. public health system and primary healthcare providers must be e e prepared to address various biological agents, including pathogens that ar rarely seen in the United States. High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they: can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have th potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness.
B to Second highest priority agents include those that: are moderately easy disseminate; result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance C issemination in the future because of: availability; ease of ality The list of potential bioterrorism agents was compiled from both CDC and NIH/NIAID websites available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp and http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/emerging/list.htm [accessed Feb. 10, 2009] .
A and we have warning time to deploy the vaccine reserve. However, as we store more vaccine, the costs for purchasing and storage increase.
Attacker.
After the defender has made their investment decisions, the attacker makes two decisions: the type of agent and the target. We will assume that the attacker has already made the decision to attack the United States with a bioterror attack. In our model, there are three agents they can choose, though this can be increased to represent the other pathogens listed in Table 3 . As stated earlier, if we only looked at the attacker decision, agent A would be the best choice. Agent B and C are the next two most attractive agents to the attacker. Again, agent B can be detected by BioWatch while agent C cannot be detected by BioWatch. The attacker has a probability of acquiring each agent. If the agent is not acquired, he cannot attack with that agent. Additionally, each agent has a lethality associated with it, represented by the agent casualty factor. Finally, each agent has a different probability of being detected over time. Generally, the longer it takes for the agent to be detected, the more consequences the U.S will suffer.
The adversary also decides what population they would target. Generally, the more population they target, the more potential consequences that could result. The attacker's decisions impact the maximum possible casualties from the scenario. There is a probability of actually attaining a low, medium or high amount of those potential casualties. This sets the stage for the next decisions by the defender.
Defender.
After warning of the attack of agent A, the defender decides whether or not to deploy the agent A vaccine reserve. The decision depends upon how much of the vaccine reserve the U.S. chose to store, whether the attacker used agent A, and the potential effectiveness given the attack warning.
Additionally, there is a cost associated with deploying the vaccine reserve.
Consequences.
In our model (Figure 4) we have two consequences: causalities and economic impact. Given the defender-attacker-defender decisions, the potential casualties given an attack and the economic impact are assessed. Casualties are based on the maximum potential casualties, the warning time given to the defender, and the effectiveness of vaccine for agent A. Economic effects are modeled with a linear model with a fixed economic effect no matter the number of casualties and a variable cost of the number of casualties times the dollars per casualty. Of course, the defender would like potential consequences (risk) given an attack to be low, while the attacker would like the potential consequences (risk) given an attack to be high. 
Budget.
Each U.S. defender decision incurs a dollar cost. The amount of money available to homeland security programs is limited by a budget determined by the President and Congress. The model will track the costs incurred and only allows spending within the budget (see appendix). We considered notional budget levels of 10M, 20M and 30M.
Risk.
Normally, a decision tree is solved by maximizing or minimizing the expected attribute at the terminal branches of the tree. In our model, the attribute is defender risk which depends on the casualty and economic consequences given an attack. We use multiple objective decision analysis 2 with an additive value (risk) model to assign risk to the defender consequences . The defender is minimizing risk and the attacker is maximizing risk. Therefore, we assign a risk of 0.0 to no consequences and a value of 1.0 to the worst case consequences in our model. We model each consequence with a linear value function (constant returns to scale) and a weight (See Appendix).
The risk functions measure returns to scale on the consequences. Of course, additional consequences could be included and different shape risk curves could be used. Some of the key assumptions in our model are listed in Table 4 (the details are in the Appendix) and some possible alternative assumptions. Given different assumptions, the model may produce different results.
We model uncertainty in probability that an adversary acquires an agent and we vary detection time by agent. Clearly, other indications and warning exist to detect possible attacks. These programs could be included in the model. We model three decisions: add Bio Watch for agent A and B, increase vaccine researve for agent A, and deploy agent A. Additionally, we assume limited decisions (i.e., 100% storage of vaccine A, 50% storage, 0% storage), but there decisions that could be modeled (e.g., other levels of storage, storing vaccines for other agents, etc).
We used one casualty model for all agents. There are other casualty and economic models that could be used.
Finally some risk assumptions that our model makes are listed. First, we assume that the risks important to the defender are the number of casualties and the economic impact but additional measures could be used. Second, we assume defenders and attackers have a diametrically opposed view of all of the objectives. Finally, we made some budget assumptions, which could be improved or modified. We assumed a number for a budget, but this budget could be modeled with more detailed cost models (e.g., Instead of adding a set amount to adding a city to the Bio Watch program, the budget could reflect different amounts depending upon the city and the robustness of the sensors installed).
Number of Strategies.
The canonical model has 108 different strategies to evaluate (Table 5 ). This is important because one 
ILLUSTRATIVE DECISION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Modeling Insights.
After modeling the canonical problem, we obtained several insights. First, in our model economic impact and casualties are highly correlated. Higher casualties will result in higher economic impact. In addition, other consequences, e.g. psychological consequences, could also be correlated with casualties. Second, there could be a large economic impact (and psychological impact), even if casualties are low.
Analysis Results of Risk versus Budget
The major risk analysis results are shown in Figure 5 . Risk shifting is occurs in our decision analysis model. In the baseline, (no defender spending) Agent A is the most effective agent for the attacker to select and the defender to consider spending resources to reduce vulnerability and/or consequences. As we improve our defense against agent A, at some point the attacker will select another agent, B. The high risk agent has shifted from agent A to B. Finally, as the budget level increases, the defender adds a city to the BioWatch program and the attackers choose to attack with agent C which Bio Watch cannot detect. We use notional data in our model, but if more realistic data were used, the defender could determine the cost benefit of additional risk reduction decisions. This decision model, using COTS software allows DHS to conduct risk management. They can quantitatively evaluate the potential risk reduction of options and make cost benefit decisions. extreme outcomes. The best risk management result would be that option 4 deterministically or stochastically dominates (SD) option 3, 3 SD 2, and 2 SD 1. The first observation we note from Figure 6 is that options 2, 3, and 4 stochasically dominate 1 since there is a lower probability for each risk outcome. A second observation is that while 4 SD 3, 4 does not SD 2 since 4 has a 0.15 proability of a risk of 0.4. This illustrates a possibly important relationship necessary for understanding how the budget might affect the defender's risk.
Value of Information/Control.
Risk managers can run a value of control or value of correlation diagram to see which nodes most directly affect the outcomes and which are correlated (Figure 7 ). Since we only have two uncertainty nodes in our canonical model, the results are not surprising. The graphs show that the ability to acquire the agent is positively correlated with the defender risk, and that it is the most important variable that defender risk managers would want to control. Admittedly, this is a basic example, but with a more complex model, analysts could determine which nodes are positively or Submitted to Risk Analysis, Journal of the Society for Risk Analysis, February 20, 2009 negatively correlated with risk and quantitatively which nodes we would most want to exercise control over or gather information about the outcomes.
Sensitivity Analysis.
Using COTS software also allows us to easily perform sensitivity analysis on key model assumptions. From the value of correlation and control above, the probability the attacker acquires the agent they choose is an important variable. COTS software allows us to perform sensitivity analysis like a rainbow and strategy region diagrams. The strategy region diagram (Figure 8 ) allows us to see changes in strategy as our assumptions about the probability of acquiring agent A and agent B change. The different colored/shaded regions represent a change in decisions, both the attacker and the defender. If our assumption about the ability to acquire agent A is wrong, we see the effects.
Currently we notionally assigned the value of probability of acquiring agent A and B are .9 and .5 respectively. The diagram was run with the model at maximum budget and it shows that if the probability of acquiring agent B rises to .6, the attackers would choose to use agent B instead of agent C. One can also see the level of defender risk rising as the probability of acquiring agent B
increasing. In addition, we see that as the probability of acquiring agent A increases, there is no overall change in risk unless the probability of acquiring agent B also increases. The defender-attacker-defender decision analysis model provides four important benefits. First, it provides a more accurate risk assessment. Second, it provides information for risk-informed decision making. Third, using COTS software that takes advantage of the existing sensitivity analysis tools. Fourth, the risk analysis can be conducted by one risk analyst with an understanding of decision trees and optimization and training on the features of the COTS software.
Risk analysis of intelligent adversaries is fundamentally different than risk analysis of uncertain hazards. As we demonstrated in Section 1.3, assigning probabilities to the decisions of intelligent adversaries underestimates the potential risk and provide an incorrect ranking of the threats. Decision tree models of intelligent adversaries provide more accurate risk assessment.
The defender-attacker-defender decision analysis provides essential information for risk management decision making. These models provide insights about resource allocation decisions to reduce risk and risk shifting. Additionally, with budget set to 0 you can assess the baseline risk. As you increase the budget, the analyst can clearly show the best risk management decisions and the risk reduction.
This model significantly simplifies the DHS BTRA model and enables the use of COTS risk analysis software. In addition, the use of COTS software enables the use of standard sensitivity analysis tools to provide insights into areas that the model should be improved or expanded.
Currently, the DHS BTRA event tree requires extensive contractor support to run, compile, and analyze results (NRC 2008) . The defender-attacker-defender decision analysis model is usable by a single risk analyst who can provide real-time analysis results to stakeholders and decision makers.
This risk analyst must understand decision trees, optimization, and have training in the COTS tool.
Limitations
Some of the limitations are actually the same as using event trees. There are limitations on the number of agents used in the models. We easily modeled 28 bio agents with reasonable run times, but there are always more agents that could be modeled. Additionally, there are challenges in assessing the probability of the uncertain events, e.g., the probability that the attacker acquires Agent A. Next, there is a limitation in modeling of the multiple consequences. Another limitation may be that in order to get more realistic results, we may have to develop "response surface" models of more complex consequence models. These are the limitations that event trees and decision trees share.
There are some decision tree limitations that are different from event trees. First, there are a limited number of risk management decisions that can realistically be modeled. Care must be used to choose the most appropriate set of potential decisions. Additionally, there may be an upper bound in the number of decisions or events the COTS software can model. In this case, an alternative would be large scale optimization software (Brown, 2005) . Finally, successful model operation and interpretation requires trained analysts who understand decision analysis and defender-attackerdefender optimization.
FUTURE WORK
This paper has demonstrated the feasibility of modeling intelligent adversary risk analysis using defender-attacker-defender decision analysis. Table 4 and the discussion in section 2.7 identified several alternative modeling assumptions that could be considered. We can modify and expand our assumptions to increase the complexity and fidelity of our canonical model. The next step is to use the model with the best data available on the agents of concern and the potential risk management options.
CONCLUSION
These defender-attacker-defender recommendations do not require a major intelligent adversary research program; they require the willingness to change (NRC, 2008) . Much of the data used for event tree models can be used in the decision analysis model. Assessing probabilities of attacker decisions will not increase our security but defender-attacker-defender decision analysis models can provide a sound assessment of risk and the essential information our nation needs to make risk-informed decisions. economy. They are joined together using a value function with weights for each objective.
APPENDIX: MODEL FORMULATION
We outline our model using a method suggested by Brown and Rosenthal (2008) . 
